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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the gap between present transport prices and efficient transport prices.
Efficient transport prices are those prices that maximise economic welfare, including external costs
(congestion, air pollution, accidents). The methodology is applied to six urban and interregional case
studies using one common optimal pricing model. The case studies cover passenger as well as freight
transport and cover all modes. We find that prices need to be raised most for peak urban passenger car
transport and to a lesser extent for interregional road transport. Optimal pricing results for public
transport are more mixed. We show that current external costs on congested roads are a bad guide for
optimal taxes and tolls: the optimal toll that takes into account the reaction of demand is often less than
one third of the present marginal external cost.
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1. Introduction
The present policy mix in European transport markets contains measures ranging from traffic
safety and environmental performance regulation of vehicles to public transport subsidies,
excises on fuel and taxes on the ownership and use of vehicles. The Green Paper of the
European Commission on Fair and Efficient Pricing (CEC,1995) concludes that this mix of
instruments yields unsatisfactory results, including excessive congestion, an excessive
accident rate and excessive pollution. The Green Paper pleads for a more fundamental role of
pricing policies to control the negative side effects of transport activities.
In this paper we analyse the gap between present transport prices and efficient transport prices
with the help of six case studies.  First, we discuss to which extent current prices deviate from
the corresponding marginal social costs. This requires the computation of resource costs,
external costs and current taxes on all transport markets. Next we compute what is the most
appropriate correction of transport taxes.
The case studies focus on the pricing of urban and interregional transport. Long range
international transport flows have not been studied, e.g., airline and shipping problems are not
treated. All other modes have been considered. Case study results are presented for four urban
areas (Amsterdam, Brussels, Dublin, London) and for interregional transport in two countries
(Belgium and Ireland). For each of these cases we construct a  reference equilibrium with
unchanged policies for 2005. By adding to this reference equilibrium information on the
different types of external costs, the resource costs and the tax levels, we are able to measure
the gap between expected prices and efficient prices. Next, we compute the optimal prices.
This computation assumes that perfect pricing instruments are available, allowing to
discriminate taxes between peak and off-peak time, between types of cars etc.
Implementation costs are not taken into account. This scenario should therefore be considered
as a benchmark, giving information on appropriate directions and magnitudes of price
changes.
The same modelling tool has been used for all the case studies. The TRENEN models
represent the transport market of a given zone by modelling the demand and supply of all
modes of transport with their interactions. The major limits of the TRENEN models are their
degree of aggregation and their static character. TRENEN represents transport demand
behaviour for a given region by representative consumers or firms.  The transport network
properties of a region are aggregated into one speed-flow relationship per mode. The model is
static: it represents the transport markets in a given period, considering the road and rail
network as fixed and assuming that the car, truck, bus and rail carriage stocks are
automatically adjusted. More precisely we assume for public transport that occupancy rates
are fixed and that the number of carriages and buses is automatically adjusted. We also
assume that the mileage per car and truck is fixed and that the car and truck ownership adjusts
in function of the desired number of vehicle-kilometres (vkm). The model therefore is well
suited to discuss optimal short-run pricing of infrastructure but not to study optimal
investment decisions in infrastructure. The case studies all focus on the year 2005.3
Using the same model structure for each of the case study areas has several advantages. First,
not only does this approach yield results that can be easily compared, it also allows us to trade
off the effects of pricing reform in urban and interregional transport markets. A second
advantage is economic consistency: all modes of transport are treated simultaneously and the
same principles are applied to each of them. A simultaneous treatment of all modes is
necessary as there may exist strong substitution possibilities.
This paper extends the literature on computing efficient transport prices in a multi-modal
framework pioneered by Glaister and Lewis (1978) and Small (1983). De Borger et al. (1996)
used a simpler model having only two modes, without an explicit welfare criterion. De Borger
et al. (1997) used a simplified TRENEN model that was only applied to Belgium. The second
version of the TRENEN model used for this paper incorporates new features, such as the
inclusion of parking costs and of economies of density in public transport. Also, the model is
applied more widely. The structure of the model and all case studies reported in this paper are
analysed more extensively in De Borger and Proost (2001).
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the modelling principles.
The next section describes some characteristics of the various case study areas. Section 4 is
devoted to an analysis of the reference equilibrium: to which extent do current pricing policies
imply prices that deviate from social marginal costs? Section 5 studies the optimal pricing
scenario. Implementation issues are discussed in Section 6. Finally, section 7 presents
conclusions.
2. Model description
2.1.         Methodology
The TRENEN models are of a strategic nature. The idea is to analyse desirable directions of
pricing reform for a given region or urban area, taking into account different constraints on
policy instruments.  These strategic models have a different purpose than the traditional
network models and are not suited to assess transport infrastructure investments.
The use of distinct model versions for urban and interregional transport is necessary because
of the specificity of the problems: both the relevant transport modes and the relative
importance of various externalities differ substantially.
The basic structure of the urban and interregional models is illustrated in Figure 1.
1 This
diagram contains three components: a demand module, a supply module and an equilibrium
price module. Both demand and supply are highly disaggregated, so the figure is only a
simplified representation.
The demand side of the model represents the choices of the users of passenger and freight
transport. Demand for passenger transport in both the urban and interregional model is
generated by assuming that a representative individual optimally allocates her income
                                                     
1 For a complete mathematical description of the urban model and the interregional model see
Proost and Van Dender (2001a, 2001b) and  De Borger (2001)￿4
between passenger transport and other goods. Many passenger transport services are
available: the individual can choose between motorised and non-motorised transport, between
time periods of travel (peak versus off-peak), and she has the option to use her car or one of
the available public transport modes (metro, tram or bus for urban transport, bus and rail for
interregional traffic). If the car mode is chosen, different types and sizes of vehicles are
available. Moreover, the individual has the explicit options of solo driving or car pooling. The
modal choice is adapted to the available infrastructure in each city or region. The demand for
freight transport in the interregional model is derived as the demand for one of the inputs in
the production process of an aggregate domestic firm (inland transport and import and export
transport) and an aggregated international firm (to represent transit through the region). The
domestic firm chooses between three modes (road, rail, inland waterways) and two time
periods. The international firm is included for two reasons:  transit may have more options for
rerouting, and the transport costs of transit firms are not passed on to domestic consumers.
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The above procedure allows us to represent the demand for each transport service in a given
geographical zone (urban area or region) as a function of (1) the generalised price (the sum of
money price and time cost) of the available transport alternatives, and (2) other factors (like
income and taste variables).
The supply side of the model is a reduced form representation of the activities and choices
made by the producers of cars, trucks, buses, fuel, car maintenance, etc. Every trip by car is
produced by combining several inputs (car, fuel, parking etc.), all of which are sold at5
marginal cost. As we assume constant returns to scale, this is compatible with perfect
competition on these markets. The policy maker can restrict the available type of vehicles
through environmental regulations. So the supply side is represented by marginal resource
costs per type of vehicle, where the environmental characteristics of the vehicles are
regulated.
For public transport we assume that the total cost function is linear and that the fixed cost
component represents all costs that are not variable with the number of buses or passengers.
The average variable cost per passenger is constant and is determined by the occupancy rate.
The variable resource cost is different for the peak and the off-peak, because of differing
occupancy rates and because the carriage (or bus) capacity cost is included in the peak period.
This is in line with the peak load pricing principle, as peak demand determines the total
number of busses or train carriages needed. So the supply of a public transport mode is
represented by one constant marginal cost per passenger-kilometre (pkm) for the peak and by
one constant marginal cost per pkm for the off-peak. The Mohring effect in urban public
transport is added via increased frequencies that reduce the expected waiting times.
2
In the equilibrium price module, generalised prices are computed for the different types of
transport services.  The generalised price will be the sum of three elements.
￿  The producer price for different types of vehicle-kilometre, as determined by the supply
module. Since mileage per car is constant, the producer price will contain resource costs
of car ownership (production and maintenance costs), of fuel and of parking. Given the
fixed occupancy rates for public transport, the producer price per passenger-kilometre
will consist of a production cost of carriages and variable maintenance, personnel and fuel
costs.
￿  A transportation time cost, which is a function of the total volume of traffic in
equilibrium.  This transportation time contains the average congestion cost and, in the
case of public transport, the value of walking and waiting times.
￿  A tax (or subsidy) that has two policy functions: to raise tax revenue or subsidise certain
modes of transportation and to correct for external costs like air pollution, marginal
congestion costs, noise accidents and road damage.  This tax will be differentiated
according to the different types of transport goods.
The optimal magnitude of the taxes will be determined by the cost of public funds
3, by the
level of the marginal external costs and by the demand elasticities for the different transport
                                                     
2 Mohring (1972) shows that there are economies of scale in the production of transit services.
When the density of demand increases, one can reduce the waiting and walking time by increasing the
frequency over time and space of services, for a given cost of provision per passenger-kilometre. The
alternative is to keep the frequency constant, increase the sizes of the buses and reduce the cost per
passenger-kilometre. In the urban model version, the occupancy factor is fixed in the peak and in the
off-peak period, but the frequency of metro and bus services (which determines the waiting time) is a
function of the level of public transport demand. Sensitivity studies on the way the Mohring effect is
modelled in TRENEN can be found in Van Dender and Proost (2001).
3 The cost of public funds is a simplified way to take account of the effects of  tax changes and
changes in public revenues on the rest of the economy. When extra tax revenue is collected in the
transport sector and used to decrease labour taxes, this can decrease the distortions caused by labour
taxes and can thus generate an extra efficiency gain. In this case the cost (or better “value in alternative6
goods. A marginal cost of public funds larger than one means that, even in the absence of
external costs, the optimal tax should be larger than the marginal resource cost for those
goods with inelastic demands, because this is a more efficient way to raise taxes than in the
rest of the economy (Ramsey pricing). When internalisation of external costs and tax revenue
raising have to be combined on several interrelated transport markets, a numerical model is
needed to compute optimal taxes.
Besides taxes, the policy maker can also impose certain regulations under the form of ad hoc
constraints on the supply part of the model: maximum emission limits per car, banning certain
types of fuels, etc.
In the urban model we distinguish four types of representative consumers: those who pay for
parking or not, and those who commute (from out of town to the CBD) and those who do not.
Those who do not pay for parking face a lower average cost per vehicle-kilometre.
Commuters and inhabitants all travel on the same abstract urban link, so that out of town
travel is not explicitly modelled. Distinguishing commuters and inhabitants is however
interesting to test imperfect pricing instruments as there are cordon tolls (only for commuters)
and parking charges (commuters make longer trips so that parking charges affect their cost
per car-kilometre relatively less.
The model is calibrated for a given reference equilibrium.  The observed reference
equilibrium corresponds to a computed equilibrium on all markets, for the observed or
forecasted money prices and quantities for all modes.  Information on the ease of substitution
between transport and other goods as well as between the different means of transport is
supplied exogenously.
4 Other important inputs are the structure of resource costs for private
and public transport, the external costs and the congestion function. The congestion function
summarises the available network information on the relation between volume of road
transport and average speed. The model is static: it represents the equilibrium for a given year
and assumes that the stock of all means of transport (private and public) is perfectly adapted
to the demand for transport. The road infrastructure and public transport infrastructure (e.g.
the rail network) are kept fixed.
Several equilibria are possible on the transport market.  We assume that the policy maker
ranks them with the help of a welfare function which makes a weighted sum of consumer
surpluses, producer surpluses, tax revenues and external costs.  The external costs include
noise, air pollution and safety.  The marginal external congestion costs are endogenously
valued in the model because they are included in the generalised costs.
Although the overall structure of the urban and interregional models is quite similar, there are
some noticeable differences. For example, the urban model includes parking costs, a Mohring
effect for public transport
5 and a positive marginal cost of public funds (of 1.066) while none
                                                                                                                                                       
uses”) of public funds is higher than one. Other uses of tax revenue are possible and this implies lower
values for values for public funds. We refer to Proost and Van Dender (2001a, 2001b) for more details.
4 Nested CES utility and production functions have been used to represent the passenger and
freight transport behaviour.
5 Mohring (1972) showed that there are economies of scale in the production of transit services.
When the density of demand increases, one can, at a given cost of provision per passenger-kilometre,
reduce the waiting and walking time by increasing the frequency over time and space of services. The7
of these are included in the interregional version. The latter, on the other hand, contains
freight transport (including transit freight) and feeds back the cost of higher freight transport
into consumption prices. Obviously both models are compromises and none of the two
models can include all features simultaneously.
2.2.         Model Use
The models can be used in two ways.  First, they can be used to compute the welfare effects
of a given policy proposal.  This enables the comparison of different policy packages in terms
of the resulting welfare effects (as well as traffic volumes, pollution, etc.). Second, the model
allows the design of optimal policy packages. In this approach the welfare function is
optimised by selecting the optimal transport and environmental policy variables. This
optimisation can be performed under different sets of restrictions on the policy instruments. In
this paper we only present the ‘full optimum’ scenario where there are no restrictions on the
policy instruments. When there are restrictions on the instruments, one obtains second best
results that trade off in a complex way the deviations from full marginal cost pricing in the
different transport markets.  A typical example is the optimality of pricing below marginal
social costs for public transportation in the peak when prices for car traffic cannot be
differentiated between the peak and the off-peak period. This is an indirect way of relieving
congestion in the peak period.
3. Description of the study areas
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the four urban areas and the two regions studied in
this paper. It is clear that in all cities and regions peak period congestion is a severe problem.
In London, off-peak congestion is high as well. The cities and areas studied differ
substantially in size and traffic flows and composition. Coverage of Northern and Southern
Europe would probably show even larger differences.
                                                                                                                                                       
alternative is to keep the frequency constant, increase the sizes of the buses and reduce the cost per
passenger-kilometre. In the urban model version, the occupancy factor is fixed in the peak and in the
off-peak period but the frequency of metro and bus services and the walking time is a function of the
level of public transport demand.8
Table 1 Characteristics of the areas studied (expected for 2005)







1.585 1.26 7.499 9.988 3.654
II. Passenger transport
Mio pkm/mode/year
Private 1287 1151 3854 18981 69386 21607
Public 412 443 1138 6302 10381 2072
III. Freight transport in
Country
III.a Total tonne-km/year 34078 6066
III.b Tonne-km/mode/year
 Road (Mio tkm/year) 22471 5459
 Railways (Mio tkm/year) 6676 607
 Waterways (Mio tkm/year) 4931
IV. Number PCU per
hour
Peak (Mio PCU/hour) Highway - - - - 5.739 3.342
Other - - - - 10.335 -
Urban 1.260 0.643 2.602 6.32 - -
Off-peak (Mio PCU/hour) Highway - - - - 1.967 1.615
Other - - - - 3.312 -
Urban 0.235 0.148 1.077 2.88 - -

























4.1.         Structure of Generalised Prices and Costs
The starting point for the model is the construction of a reference case for each city and
region. A crucial element in constructing reference equilibria is the determination of prices
and marginal social costs for all relevant transport services. First, prices in the reference case
are to be interpreted as generalised prices that include the value of travel time experienced by
the user. For example, for car traffic the generalised price per kilometre is calculated as the
sum of the corresponding resource cost (for fuel, maintenance, etc.), the time cost of the
traveller (the monetary evaluation of the time spent in traffic) and any taxes that are being
paid, expressed on a per kilometre basis. For public transport the generalised price consists of
the money price plus the value of travel time; if public transport is subsidised beyond the
fixed part of the costs, the money price will be below the corresponding marginal resource
cost. It is clear that because of differences in congestion the generalised price per kilometre
may be quite different for the peak and off-peak periods.
Second, the marginal social cost associated with a particular transport service consists of the
marginal resource cost, the time cost experienced by the traveller, and the marginal external9
cost. The latter includes the marginal external cost of congestion, pollution, noise, accident
risks and road damage. Note that the gap between generalised price and marginal social cost
for each mode and transport service gives an indication of the most important inefficiency of
current transport pricing policies.
The resource costs of transport are those associated with the (internal) production of transport;
it is a private cost to the provider or user. It depends on three main elements: the capital costs
of the infrastructure and the vehicles, the choice of fuel and the speed of traffic (which
depends on traffic flow).  This latter factor is particularly relevant in determining time costs
and fuel usage. The resource costs are derived from a detailed analysis of the capital and
depreciation costs and the direct operating costs of each mode, varying according to size of
vehicle and fuel type. Road infrastructure is taken as fixed, but the stock of cars, buses, trucks
and rail carriages is assumed to be fully adjustable to changes in demand. Similarly, rail and
waterway infrastructure are assumed to be fixed, but the number of rail carriages and inland
navigation ships can be completely adapted to demand. The marginal capacity costs of rail
carriages and buses are allocated to the peak period, consistent with the peak-load pricing
principle which states that in the case of fully flexible capacity, the peak load price should
equal the marginal operating costs and the marginal capacity cost.
One element which requires some discussion is that of parking costs since this is an important
element in the different policy scenarios for the urban areas considered.  Typically, large
groups of the population do not have to pay the full resource costs of parking.  We assume
that a parking spot is only needed for urban trips at the final destination. In the reference
cases, it is assumed that only 30% of cars actually pay the resource cost of parking, the
remainder park for free (except for Amsterdam where the assumption is that 70% are payers).
The way parking is introduced in the TRENEN model is discussed in great detail in Calthrop
et al. (2000).
As previously indicated, the generalised price is obtained by adding to the resource costs
(obviously excluding parking resource costs for non-paying car travellers) the current level of
taxes payable in the form of vehicle and fuel taxes, and an estimate of the time costs
experienced by travellers. The latter is based on appropriate values of time and estimates of
the speed-flow relationship for each mode and time period. The marginal social cost includes
the private resource cost of the mode (and the resource cost of parking where relevant) and
the time cost as above, to which the marginal external cost of the mode is added.  The
marginal external cost depends on congestion, as given by the speed-flow relationship, and
on the various external costs.  Of these, the key element is the congestion cost which is driven
by the relevant speed-flow relationship, as estimated for each case study on the basis of
‘fitting’ a congestion function to observed data and results of detailed network models. The
functional form of the speed flow relationship is identical for all case studies and is based on
O’Mahony et al. (1997).
To get a feeling for the congestion functions used, they are graphically reproduced in Figure 2
for the urban cases and in Figure 3 for the interurban cases (congestion functions are
presented for both highways and other main roads in the case of Belgium). Both the position
and the shape of the congestion functions highly depend on the characteristics of the road10
network. The current congestion levels (and associated speeds) as well as the corresponding
marginal external congestion costs additionally depend on local or regional traffic flows.














































































































































































To give an example of the comparison of generalised prices and marginal social costs in the
reference situation, consider the example for London in Figure 4. The figure gives the
different components of the calculated reference prices and marginal social costs for four
types of transport service: a small petrol single occupancy car in peak and off-peak, assuming
that the driver benefits from free parking and also the use of a bus in the peak period and in
the off-peak period.
Each pair of columns in Figure 4 represents generalised price and marginal social costs per
passenger-kilometre for one of the four cases. With respect to the car mode the figure shows
that peak prices and marginal social costs are substantially higher than the corresponding
figures for the off-peak period. Moreover, marginal social costs in both periods are
approximately twice the level of generalised prices.  A large part of this is due to the high
levels of parking resource costs which are not paid for in the case where free parking is
available, the remainder can be explained by external (congestion) cost differences. Note that
if parking were to be paid for at resource cost, this element would also appear in the price12
paid and the shortfall of price from cost would be correspondingly less. It is also clear that, at
least for the London case, marginal external cost exceeds the tax paid (expressed on a per
passenger-kilometre basis) in the peak period, but that the opposite holds in the off-peak.
Again, congestion is mainly responsible for this finding.
For bus transport, the prices are marginally higher than the marginal social cost. Taxes
substantially exceed marginal external costs.  Bus prices per pkm are similar to those for car,
but marginal social costs are smaller, especially in the peak.

































Figure 4 shows clearly that the external congestion cost dominates in the peak period. Other
important external costs are accidents and air pollution. The methodology for the estimation
of the marginal external costs is described in Mayeres and Van Dender (2001), the accident
externalities computation draws on empirical work by Dickerson et al. (2000). The external
air pollution costs are based on emissions of new cars and uses results of the Extern-E study
of the European Communities (Bickel et al., 1997).
4.2.         Comparison of the Reference Equilibrium between Case Studies
The same procedure was followed in each of the study areas to estimate generalised prices
and marginal social costs.
Some interesting results for the reference equilibria in the different cities and regions are
given in Figures 5 to 11. Information is provided for each of the same four transport services
discussed in connection with the London example underlying Figure 4. In each of these
figures one finds for each case study, two rectangular blocks. The left hand side diagram
shows the composition of the private cost per passenger-kilometre, the right hand side column
shows the different components of the social marginal cost. The figures demonstrate some13
substantial differences both in the estimated level of marginal social costs between cases, and
in the disparity between generalised prices and social costs.
Consider estimated peak car costs in Figure 5. The figure shows that marginal social costs in
Amsterdam and Brussels are almost twice those in London or Dublin, mainly due to
congestion cost differences. Brussels and Amsterdam  seem to operate at a much stronger
sloped point on the speed flow diagram than Dublin and London. Estimates of generalised
prices are reasonably close together, although their composition is quite different. For
example, tax levels are much higher in London and time costs are much higher in Amsterdam.
In the two regions considered (Belgium and Ireland), peak car prices and marginal social
costs are much lower than in the urban cases analysed.  This is mainly due to higher average
speeds in the interurban environment. The generalised price is slightly higher in Ireland than
in Belgium, but the opposite holds for the marginal social cost, mainly due to external cost
differences.
Turning to off-peak car costs and prices (see Figure 6) we observe a more consistent pattern
across the different cities with the exception of substantially higher costs in London, due to
the much higher resource costs of parking. Off-peak prices are also higher in London due to
higher congestion levels (time costs) and higher tax levels.  For most case studies the
marginal external cost estimates do not differ so much in the off-peak, where congestion is
less of a problem. For the interregional cases, off-peak marginal social costs as well as prices
remain lower than in the urban situations. External costs are much lower than in the peak, and
they are higher in Ireland than in Belgium. This is due to higher road maintenance costs as
well as higher air pollution emissions. Note also that taxes in both countries slightly exceed
the corresponding marginal external cost, at least for the off-peak period.


































































































































Bus costs and prices in the reference case are affected principally by the extent to which bus
services are subsidised. The cost of public transport was assumed to consist of a fixed
component (independent of the number of passengers) and a variable component. The
marginal social cost of public transport only captures the variable cost component. Per
vehicle-kilometre, the marginal social cost is greater in the peak than in the off-peak period
because it includes the capital costs of vehicles and carriages.  However, occupancy rates are
higher in peak periods, so that the per passenger-kilometre cost can be lower in the peak. We
interpret subsidies consistently as a situation where variable costs are not covered by
revenues.
With these ideas in mind, consider Figures 7 and 8. Note that subsidies
6 are identified in both
Amsterdam and Dublin in the peak period, whereas both in Amsterdam and especially in
Brussels off-peak public transport is subsidised.  These negative taxes are set against the
resource costs in each case.  Generally there is a closer fit between generalised prices and
marginal social cost for bus transport than for car traffic in both the peak and off-peak periods
in all of the urban areas. In London, where support to public transport is much lower, prices
tend to exceed social marginal costs.  In the other cities, prices are generally smaller than
social costs, although for Dublin (in the peak) and Brussels (in the off-peak) this is only due
to the level of subsidy.  Per passenger-kilometre, external costs are generally much less
significant for buses than for cars. Finally, in the two regions considered, subsidies are
identified in the peak period; in the off-peak, Irish bus use is subsidised but in Belgium bus
users pay slightly more than the resource cost, resulting in small taxes.  A similar analysis can
be made for other public transport modes (underground, rail, tram).
                                                     
6 By subsidies we mean prices below marginal resource costs. We assume that the fixed costs of
public transport are covered from public revenues.15
Figure 7 Peak bus reference prices and costs
Figure 8 Off-peak bus reference prices and costs
Finally, consider Figures 9, 10 and 11 in which information related to interregional freight
transport is presented for Belgium and Ireland. Road transport is characterised by fairly
similar generalised prices and marginal social costs in the two countries. Prices are way below
marginal social costs. For rail freight transport, resource costs and subsidies in Ireland are
much larger than in Belgium. However, generalised prices in the two countries are similar.
External costs by rail are quite small.
This analysis of the reference case shows clearly the potential for better adjustment of prices






































































































5. The full optimum scenario
The full optimum scenario for the various cities and regions was calculated by maximising
economic welfare under the assumption that perfect pricing instruments are available. This
implies, amongst others, the existence of a pricing technology that allows price differentiation
between peak and off-peak road traffic, according to the differences in external costs
generated. Moreover, in the urban model it implies the possibility to discriminate between
inhabitants and commuters, and to operate a system of charges so as to make drivers pay the
resource cost of parking. In the interregional model it implies the possibility to differentiate
between domestic and transit traffic, and to differentiate between the use of highways and
other main roads. Finally, in both models it implies the possibility of introducing improved
vehicle emission technologies. Although refined discriminatory charges may prove very
costly to implement, the full optimum yields an interesting estimate of the maximum gross
benefit from improved pricing in the transport sector.
In the remainder of this section we present some summary results. We discuss the optimal
prices in the different cities and regions, we look at the correspondingly optimal traffic
volumes, we describe the main welfare effects relative to the reference equilibrium, and we
briefly discuss the impact on travel speeds. We limit the presentation and discussion of results
to a few relevant submarkets.
5.1.         Passenger transport
We first focus on passenger transport prices in the different cities. In Table 3 we present three
pieces of information for a few submarkets (for example, a small gasoline car used in the peak
period, off-peak bus transport, etc.) in all cities: the percentage increase in the full optimum
price relative to the reference situation, the optimal tax (EURO/pkm), and the marginal
external cost (EURO/km) at the optimum. To calculate percentage price increases we took
into account the fact that only a fraction of car users pay the resource cost of parking in the
reference case. In other words, the reference prices used to determine the percentage changes
were a weighted average of prices for those that paid for parking and those that did not.
Several implications of the results are worth noting. One finding is that optimal pricing
requires very large percentage increases in the price of car use in the peak period in all cities
studied. Figures vary from 73% (London) to over 280% (Amsterdam) for inhabitants and
from 74% (Dublin) to 282% (Amsterdam) for commuters. The large price increases come
from two sources: high congestion in the peak implies high marginal externality taxes, and all
car users pay the resource cost of parking in the full optimum. Another important finding is
that the optimal price adjustment is much lower than the marginal external cost measured in
the reference equilibrium. For Brussels, the marginal external cost in the reference
equilibrium is over 1.5  Euro/vkm for a small gasoline car. The optimum tax is only
0.6 Euro/vkm. This is due to the external congestion costs that depend directly on the volume
of traffic. The efficient volume of traffic is much lower than in the reference and this implies
a much lower congestion tax. Also note that, in all cities, peak car users optimally pay
somewhat more than the corresponding marginal external cost. This can be explained by the
non-zero shadow cost of public funds used in urban models, which means that 1 EURO of18
government tax revenue is valued at 1.066 EURO of consumer benefits. The consequence is
that deviations between taxes and marginal external costs tend to be higher for non-elastic
goods.  Accounting for parking costs also introduces a remarkable difference between
inhabitants and commuters. Inhabitants face at the optimum a higher tax per kilometre than
commuters. Since commuters can spread out the parking fees over a larger average distance
travelled, the impact of parking fees on the tax per kilometre is much smaller than for
inhabitants.
The prices of off-peak car use all increase as well, although typically by much less than in the
peak (ranging from 37% in Brussels to 220% in Amsterdam).  This is due to fully charging
parking costs and external costs.  Again, all off-peak taxes exceed marginal external costs,
and the extra tax is relatively higher than in peak periods.  Also note that diesel is generally
taxed slightly higher than gasoline in order to reflect differences in external pollution costs.
The recent Extern-E estimates have been used as a basis for the estimation of the air pollution
costs. They show that external costs of diesel and gasoline vary strongly in function of
population density, and that they are indeed higher for diesel.
Public transport prices rise in all cities and in both the peak and off-peak periods: existing
subsidies are eliminated and replaced by taxes that reflect marginal external costs and a
variety of own and cross-price elasticities. In Brussels and Dublin, off-peak public transport
prices exceed those in the peak due to large differences in peak and off-peak occupancy rates.
Turning to the results in Table 4 for the interregional models applied to Belgium and Ireland,
the following observations can be made. First, all prices equal marginal social costs, since a
zero shadow cost of public funds was assumed in these analyses. Second, peak car prices rise
by 38% to 45% for gasoline and by 79% and 57% for diesel; these differences are due to
higher external costs and lower initial taxes on diesel. Off-peak car prices slightly decrease,
by some 6% in Ireland and 10% in Belgium. The reason is that the existing tax system already
implies taxes that exceed the marginal external cost at the optimum.
Bus prices rise in both the peak and off-peak periods. The larger increase in the peak can be
explained by the higher external cost in this period and the lower initial tax in the existing tax
system. Optimal bus taxes are much larger in Ireland than in Belgium, reflecting differences
in external costs.
The drastic price increases of many transport services imply some obvious changes in
transport volumes. The relevant changes are summarised in Table 5. Not surprisingly, all peak
car traffic declines. The reduction is limited to some 9-12% in the interregional model, but
ranges from 19% (Dublin) to 33% (London) in the urban areas considered. The response of
off-peak car traffic volumes to optimal price changes is quite different in the urban and
regional environments. A decline is observed in all cities (ranging from 8% in Brussels to
41% in London), whereas both in Belgium and Ireland interregional off-peak car volumes
rise, by 7% and 6% respectively. The reason is that off-peak car use in the interregional
environment becomes cheaper at the full optimal price levels.19
Table 3 Prices (% change w.r.t. reference), taxes and costs (Euro/pkm) for the urban case studies
in the full optimum scenario
URBAN MODEL *
Amsterdam Brussels Dublin London
Money Money Money Money
Price Tax MEC Price Tax MEC Price Tax MEC Price Tax MEC
Peak car petrol
Inhabitants 147% 0.91 0.80 155% 0.60 0.46 116% 0.45 0.24 152% 0.54 0.11
Commuters 233% 0.84 0.80 138% 0.56 0.46 91% 0.39 0.24 128% 0.44 0.11
Off-peak car
petrol
Inhabitants 179% 0.13 0.08 61% 0.20 0.05 67% 0.25 0.076 135% 0.44 0.06
Peak car diesel
Inhabitants 146% 0.93 0.82 134% 0.61 0.49 143% 0.47 0.27 176% 0.55 0.13
Peak bus
Inhabitants 63% 0.05 0.05 38% 0.08 0.02 424% 0.15 0.012 23% 0.15 0.00
Off-peak bus
Inhabitants -1% -0.02 0.05 210% 0.10 0.01 124% 0.17 0.00 71% 0.12 0.00
*Improved emission technologies
Public transport volumes in the peak period increase everywhere, with the exception of
Ireland. The reason for the latter finding is the strong public transport price increase because
of high initial Irish subsidy levels. In the off-peak period no consistent picture emerges due to
differences in optimal price adjustments: Amsterdam and London experience a strong
increase in public transport use, Belgium (including Brussels) and Ireland face a reduction of
some 20%.
Optimal pricing induces reductions in total transport volumes of some 7% to 14% in the urban
areas considered, and much smaller effects (2-3%) in regional transport. The largest impact is
to be expected in Dublin and London.
Table 4 Prices (% change wrt reference), taxes and costs (Euro/pkm) for the interregional case
studies in the full optimum scenario
Belgium Ireland
Money Money
Price Tax MEC Price Tax MEC
Peak car small petrol
Inhabitants 45% 0.195 0.195 38% 0.234 0.233
Off-peak car small petrol
Inhabitants -10% 0.056 0.056 -6% 0.097 0.096
Peak car small diesel
Inhabitants 79% 0.202 0.202 57% 0.240 0.239
Peak bus
Inhabitants 127% 0.027 0.028 143% 0.082 0.082
Off-peak bus
Inhabitants 47% 0.018 0.020 110% 0.056 0.05620
Table 5 Total volume and composition of traffic (% change wrt reference)
URBAN MODEL* INTERREGIONAL MODEL*
Amsterdam Brussels Dublin London Belgium Ireland
Peak private -28% -22% -19% -33% -12% -9%
Peak public 34% 28% -30% 32% 11% -33%
Off-peak private -19% -8% -14% -41% 7% 6%
Off-peak public 53% -22% 0% 84% -20% -19%
Total volume -6.66% -8.25% -14.32% -13.73% -2.86% -2.35%
*Improved emission technologies
Finally, consider the implications of optimal pricing for the speed of passenger transport
flows. These are summarised in Table 6. All average speeds in the peak period substantially
increase, reflecting congestion reductions.  In the off-peak the impact is small.
Table 6 Speeds (% change wrt reference)
URBAN MODEL* INTERREGIONAL
MODEL*
Amsterdam Brussels Dublin London Belgium Ireland
Peak private 50% 70% 32% 13% 5% (86%) 12%
Peak public 50% 70% 32% 14% 86% 12%
Off-peak private 3% 0% 3% 2% 0%  (-1%) -1%
Off-peak public 3% 0% 3% 2% 0% -1%
* improved vehicle emission technologies
5.2.         Freight transport
Freight transport is explicitly included in the interregional models only. Therefore, results are
limited to the Belgian and Irish interregional case studies. Results are in Table 7.
At the full optimum, road transport is substantially more expensive as compared to the
reference situation. In the peak period the price per ton-kilometre increases by 63% (Belgium)
and 100% (Ireland) respectively. Off-peak road freight transport prices rise as well, by 7% to
36%. Prices of rail freight services at the optimum reflect marginal social costs, which implies
price increases of 15% and 353% for Belgium and Ireland, respectively. The figure for Ireland
is to be interpreted in view of extremely high subsidies in the reference case. No notable price
change is in effect for inland waterways, which are only relevant in Belgium.
The implications for freight traffic volumes are summarised in table 8. As far as Belgium is
concerned, domestic freight traffic flows by road decline by 5% in the peak, and by some 3%
overall. Rail loses traffic as well, some 12%. The main beneficiary of optimal prices is
waterway transport: flows increase by 3%. The picture for transit freight is slightly different:
road traffic gains, rail loses substantially (26%), waterways gain (some 9%). Total freight
flows decline by 3.73% as a consequence of optimal pricing policies.
The enormous rail price increases in Ireland yield a different picture. Total road traffic
volume actually increases as a consequence of the relative price reduction in comparison with21
rail services. Rail loses substantially. Overall there is a marked reduction in freight flows by
some 7.5%.
Table 7 Prices (% change w.r.t. reference), taxes and costs (EURO per tonnekm)
Belgium Ireland
Money Marginal Money Marginal
Price Tax exter. cost Price Tax exter. cost
FREIGHT (domestic)
Peak road 63% 0.046 0.046 100% 0.085 0.085
Off-peak road 7% 0.013 0.013 36% 0.039 0.038
Railways 15% 0.003 0.003 353% 0.004 0.004
Waterways 0% 0.004 0.004 - - -










Total volume -3.73% -7.44%
5.3.         Welfare gains
A summary of the welfare implications of optimal pricing policies is given in table 9.
Welfare gains are presented as a percentage of total income.
7  They are gross gains, since
specific implementation costs of new pricing systems are not taken into account.  First note
that households are better off in all cities and regions considered. The reduction in congestion
and pollution combined with the reimbursement of tax payments outweighs the utility loss
due to the price increases of transport services. The largest percentage gains are observed in
Brussels and Amsterdam, the welfare gains in Ireland are proportionally smaller. Second,
optimal pricing induces large tax revenue increases. For passenger transport, increases are
much more limited in interregional transport than in the urban areas considered: they range
from 25% in Belgium to over 170% in Amsterdam and Brussels.
In all urban case studies improvements in technology are found to be welfare-improving. In
the interregional environment this is the case for diesel cars, but not for petrol cars. For diesel
cars used in interurban transport the reduction in pollution compensates for the increase in
resource cost.
In all cities and regions, external congestion costs as well as other external costs decline. In
interregional contexts, reductions in external costs other than congestion are much smaller.
                                                     
7 Note that these are percentages of total generalised income (money income plus total leisure
time times value of time) and are therefore not negligible.22
They amount to 3% and 5% in Ireland and Belgium respectively. This can be explained by the
much smaller external air pollution and noise costs in interregional areas due to lower
population densities. For this reason it seems no longer optimal to select improved car
emission technologies for petrol cars in interregional areas.
Table 9 Welfare (% gain wrt the reference equilibrium), Total external costs and Tax revenues
(% change wrt reference)
URBAN MODEL*;** INTERREGIONAL MODEL**
Amsterdam Brussels Dublin London Belgium Ireland
Welfare gain 1.29% 1.22% 0.47% 1.04% 0.80% 0.29%
Tax revenue
Passenger 171% 185% 123% 108% 25% 29%
Freight - - - - 233% §
Technologies
Small gasoline Improved Improved Improved Improved Standard Standard
Big gasoline Improved Improved Improved Improved Standard Standard
Small diesel Improved Improved Improved Improved Improved Improved
Big diesel Improved Improved Improved Improved Improved Improved
External costs -14% -13% -16% -35% -5% -3%
(other than
congestion)
§ % change not calculable because of negative value in the reference situation. Tax revenue increases
from -0.027 (in the reference) to 0.696 (in the Full Optimum).
6. Implementation of new pricing policies
The case studies have shown that the pricing policies for transport are potentially welfare
improving. The two major elements of the new policies are the overall higher price levels and
their degree of differentiation over time and space. A general increase of the price levels of
transport and appropriate differentiation brings them in line with the corresponding social
costs. Of course, the translation of simulation results of highly simplified models to
policymaking raises many issues. We discuss five of them: the reliability of the results, the
costs of implementation, the use of tax revenues, the division of authority and the relation
with environmental and safety policies.
6.1.         Reliability of results
The main contribution of using highly simplified models is to advance a direction of reform
that is logical and internally consistent. Of course, using simple models to simulate important
changes comes at a cost and is always somewhat risky. Therefore, the results need
confirmation in several ways. More sensitivity testing and use of the models on a larger part
of the European Community is needed, as well as verifications on the basis of more detailed
models and experiments. Network models can provide the necessary spatial disaggregation,
while dynamic models are well suited to study in more detail the optimal transition to better
pricing instruments.23
6.2.         Implementation costs of road pricing
In the simulation results, no account has been taken of the transaction costs of new pricing
technologies such as road pricing. The implementation costs consist of the costs of extra
equipment in the vehicles, sensor equipment along the roads and operating costs. The latter
may include important enforcement and monitoring costs. We have not studied the practical
implementation and it is therefore difficult to advance cost estimates for the different cities
and countries. Previous studies have shown that the cost of the simpler pricing systems (e.g.,
one or two city cordons) cost about 30 to 50 EURO per car per year. This amounts to some 20
to 30% of the gross benefits of congestion pricing. Moreover, the cost of these systems
decreases every year due to learning effects and technological evolution. A reliable and cheap
road pricing technology with technical specifications that are harmonised all over Europe is a
prerequisite for the pricing reforms studied in this paper.
6.3.         Use of externality tax revenues
The pricing reforms studied can be an important source of net tax revenue. For public
transport the case is different from country to country. In some cities and countries, the
marginal resource costs of public transport are not covered by the fares and this subsidy is no
longer justified for efficiency reasons when the other modes can be priced correctly. In other
countries, an important extension of public transport is justified and this could, given the
decreasing marginal social cost of public transport, require higher subsidies.
In the analysis it has been assumed that the net revenue from the transport sector is used in an
efficient way in the rest of the economy. More specifically, the implicit assumption has been
that these revenues are used to decrease other existing distortionary taxes (e.g., taxes on
labour). When this efficient use of tax revenue is guaranteed, optimal taxes in the transport
sector should in general be higher than the marginal social costs. Of course, if the increased
tax revenue is used inefficiently by spending it on non-justified projects in the transport sector
or in other sectors, the optimal level of taxes in the transport sector could very well be much
smaller than those proposed here.
In the transport pricing debate, two ways of using the extra revenue often are advocated. The
first is an investment in road infrastructure and in public transport. Investments in road
infrastructure (beyond adaptation of the network to road pricing) are not necessarily justified
by the mere fact that funds are available. Road pricing will decrease the use of existing roads
to the most efficient level and can be seen as a short-term substitute for road extension
projects. It is the new, lower level of road use that should be considered as the basis for
investment appraisal. Investments in public transport infrastructure are probably needed in
most cities and regions. There is, however, no relation between the net revenue from optimal
pricing in the transport sector and the needs for subsidies to public transport. Every project
has to be judged on its own merits given the transport demand levels that can be expected
with new pricing. An important second type of claim on the increased tax revenues on the
transport sector is based on an income distribution argument. An attempt can be made to
compensate all victims and in particular low income groups. Although it is technically
speaking impossible and inefficient to compensate all victims, all households will be24
compensated by a reduction of taxes and by improved transport quality (higher speeds in peak
periods). The poor households may need a specific compensation because of equity concerns.
The best way to do this is via specific income supplements rather than via reduced transport
prices. As a consequence distributional arguments do not provide a compelling reason not to
account for external costs in pricing structures.
6.4.         Who decides best on new prices ?
The most important requirement of more efficient pricing systems is that they should be
adapted to local transport conditions. This requires that the levels of taxes on road use should
not be fully harmonised at a European level, but need to be varied, both between urban and
interregional areas and between different cities. One implication of optimal pricing is that the
role of fuel taxes and registration taxes decreases, because road pricing systems take over
their revenue and regulating function. This requires that the authority on pricing decisions will
have to move at least partly from the European level to the national and local levels. This
raises two issues. First, what is the appropriate reallocation of transport tax revenues over
levels of government? As there will be a shift of tax resources to the more local levels, this
requires compensations for the other governmental levels if there is no parallel shift in public
expenditure responsibilities. The second problem is related with the incentive of local
governments to implement correct pricing levels. Local governments have superior
information on local transport conditions but may abuse the new instrument to engage in tax
practices where non-residents pay more than the marginal external costs.  This can only partly
be avoided by requiring non-discriminatory road pricing as the local governments may
systematically charge more on routes or modes that are used more frequently by non-
residents.
6.5.         Safety and pollution policies
This study addresses several types of externalities simultaneously. The case studies have
mainly been focused on the congestion externality. The major policy instrument studied has
been the price of different transport modes at different times of the day. As the congestion
problem is directly linked to the flow of transport this is the most successful instrument.
Accident externalities and air pollution externalities have been reduced simultaneously but
other complementary instruments should be used to reduce them. In the case studies, the
imposed introduction of cleaner vehicles has been studied briefly. This needs to be
complemented by instruments that address the present variance in car emissions as a function
of make, age, fuel quality and maintenance. The same holds for the noise and road damage
externalities. Furthermore, the accident externalities need to be addressed with specific
instruments that pay attention to the driver’s behaviour (insurance and liability incentives) and
to the potential of infrastructure and road safety policies.25
7. Conclusions
In this paper a common modelling methodology has been used to estimate the gap between
present and efficient prices for passenger and freight transport in six zones in Europe. Starting
from observations on current prices and volumes, reference equilibria were constructed for
the six cases. Combining current taxes with external costs estimates and unpaid resource costs
produced estimates of the current inefficiencies in the pricing policies of transport in Europe.
Peak private passenger and peak private freight transport were found to have marginal
external costs which are considerably larger than the current tax levels and parking was found
to be an important unpaid resource cost in urban areas. In the off-peak period, taxes on private
transport are sometimes too high and sometimes too low. For public transport the picture is
more complex with, depending on the case study, too low and too high subsidies on variable
costs. Efficient prices need to be computed such that the price level corresponds to the
marginal social cost at the efficient level of traffic. This means that optimal taxes are much
lower than the marginal external costs measured in the reference equilibrium. Nevertheless,
important increases in the money prices of peak private transport are required (between 35%
and 233%) leading to decreases in volumes between 10 and 33%. This requires spatial and
time differentiated road pricing. Also public transport prices will need to be revised in certain
zones. A reduction of the important subsidies on the variable costs of off-peak public
transport is one of the priorities.
Important welfare gains can be achieved when this type of reform is implemented. Of course,
the results presented here are from a simple modelling exercise that needs to be confirmed by
case studies in the rest of the EU, and by the use of more detailed models and experiments.26
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